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NOTES
INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE THROUGH AN INTERNET LENS:
IS THE DOCTRINE'S DEMISE TRULY INEVITABLE?
INTRODUCTION
Modern trade secret law is, at a very basic level, a study in
balance. At its core lies the onerous task of assuring that vital
business information remains confidential, while simultaneously
preventing the strong public policy of employee mobility from
growing dangerously close to extinction. Nowhere is this con-
flicting dichotomy more evident than in the enigmatic doctrine of
"inevitable disclosure." This judicially crafted doctrine prevents a
departing employee with knowledge of secret company information
from finding similar employment elsewhere, under the theory that
such employment would "inevitably" lead to the disclosure of his
former employer's trade secrets. Application of the doctrine-which
varies greatly from state to state-often manifests itself in one of
two ways: (1) An equitable tool used to interpret the reasonableness
and validity of non-compete clauses in employment contracts; and
(2) A means of preventing an employee from accepting similar
employment in the same field, even in the absence of a covenant not
to compete.
In the specific context of the Internet industry, this Note focuses
on the latter of these two inevitable disclosure formulations, and
argues that, if restrictively applied, the doctrine remains viable
as an equitable tool in the law of trade secrets. Part I gives a
brief history of trade secret law in the United States, discussing
the elements of trade secrets generally and illustrating policy
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considerations that underlie the body of law as a whole. Part II
discusses the inevitable disclosure doctrine generally, provides an
in-depth look at the modern-day conception of inevitable disclosure
as the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals enunciated in PepsiCo, Inc.
v. Redmond,' and examines the abundance of scholarly criticisms
of the doctrine. Part III looks at inevitable disclosure in the context
of the Internet industry, investigates industry-specific applications
of the doctrine, and provides a proposal for applying the inevitable
disclosure doctrine within the ambit of the Internet field. Finally,
this Note concludes that the doctrine is workable, if applied in a
very specific manner.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
A. The Evolution of Trade Secret Law
The origins of trade secret law can be traced back as far as the
early nineteenth century, when English industrialists became
increasingly concerned with the misdeeds of their employees in
various business contexts-misdeeds which resulted in the dis-
closure of vital information intentionally shielded from the public.2
Using English decisions as the framework for their own trade secret
jurisprudence, American courts began to recognize the profound
importance of safeguarding such information as early as 1837,3 thus
beginning the steady and deliberate common law evolution of trade
secret protection.4
The American Law Institute's publication of the Restatement
(First) of Torts crystallized American trade secret law into a
single, comprehensive set of guidelines in 1939.' Section 757 of the
1. 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
2. See Benjamin A. Emmert, Comment, Keeping Confidence with Former Employees:
California Courts Apply the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine to California Trade Secret Law,
40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171, 1174 (2000) (explaining the scope of trade secret law in
nineteenth-century England).
3. See Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523 (1837) (dealing with information for a
"secret manner of making chocolate").
4. See David Lincicum, Note, Inevitable Conflict?: California's Policy ofWorker Mobility
and the Doctrine of'Inevitable Disclosure," 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2002) (noting that
state courts initially developed a diverse body of trade secret law).
5. Emmert, supra note 2, at 1176.
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Restatement and its accompanying comments attempted to
synthesize the amalgam of trade secret case law by offering a gen-
eral definition of what constituted a trade secret,6 explaining the
level of secrecy required to qualify for trade secret protection,7
determining in which situations the receipt of classified information
could be viewed as an impropriety, 8 and suggesting remedies for
trade secret misappropriation.9 Though lauded for the degree of
uniformity it injected into the structure of trade secret law, the
First Restatement was unable to effect a truly comprehensive model
on which courts could confidently rely for guidance in the modern
business world; specifically, it neglected to give protection to in-
formation whose value was short-lived, it provided a definition of a
trade secret that lacked the substance necessary to aid the legal
community, and it created a shroud of ambiguity that resulted in
widely disparate holdings in misappropriation cases.10
In response to the confusion born from the failings of the First
Restatement, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Law in 1979 passed the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(UTSA), an archetypal trade secret statute created to fill in the
holes that Section 757 created. Since its passage, forty-three states
nationwide (and the District of Columbia) have adopted the UTSA
in various forms," and lawmakers and judges alike view the UTSA
as the prevailing authority in the field.
6. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
7. See id.
8. See id. at cmt. g.
9. See id. at cmt. e.
10. See Emmert, supra note 2, at 1176-77. Despite these shortcomings and the advent
of more modern statutes, however, the First Restatement still occupies an important role in
trade secret law today. Id. at 1176.
11. MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 3.29 (2003). Only seven states have not
adopted the UTSA: Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas,
and Wyoming.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
B. Trade Secret Law Under the UTSA
1. Establishing the Existence of a Trade Secret
The first step involved in acquiring trade secret protection under
the UTSA is establishing that such a secret exists. A logical
approach, then, is to look at the UTSA's definition of a trade secret,
a definition that evinces a higher degree of objectivity and ex-
pansiveness than the one the First Restatement supplied. As the
UTSA defines:
"Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process,
that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject
of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy."
A careful reading of this definition suggests three main criteria
that must be met before information can be termed a trade secret
under the UTSA."3 First, the information must have some eco-
nomic value, giving its holder a tangible business benefit." Its
character must be important enough such that a competitor
"would materially benefit from knowing the information and would
have to spend time and money to create the same information
independently." 5 Second, the information must be incapable of
being easily discovered by lawful means."6 In other words, if a
competitor can simply look at a publicly accessible company product
12. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (1996). Cf RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) OF TORTS § 757
cmt. b (defining trade secret as "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information
which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage
over competitors who do not know or use it").
13. See John H. Matheson, Employee Beware: the Irreparable Damage of the Inevitable
Disclosure Doctrine, 10 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 145, 148-49 (1998).
14. Id. at 148.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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and understand the information sought to be protected, such
information is not a trade secret, and any publication of the
information would necessarily eliminate its secret classification. 7
Finally, the company seeking to protect the information must take
reasonable steps to assure its secrecy.'8 This objective requirement
does not require that the owner of confidential information have
exclusive knowledge of the secret; employees and other important
individuals may have access to the information without undoing its
protected status as a secret.'9 Rather, if a company employs a
legitimate secrecy policy and makes reasonable efforts actually to
enforce the policy, then it has satisfied the secrecy requirement of
the UTSA--"[ol nly reasonable efforts, not all conceivable efforts, are
required." °
The UTSA thus provides a more concrete standard through which
the trade secret status of business information can be judged. More
importantly in terms of its overall impact, however, is its relevance
in the area of trade secret misappropriation.
2. Trade Secret Misappropriation
Once a trade secret is in play, the dispositive question becomes
whether misappropriation has occurred. Under the UTSA, a trade
secret is misappropriated if it is (1) acquired by "improper means,"
or (2) disclosed or used by an individual who either used improper
means to acquire it or knew that he was under a duty to protect its
secrecy." Misappropriation occurs in one of three ways: acquisition
17. Id.
18. Id. at 148-49.
19. Id. Courts have recognized many factors as evidence of reasonable secrecy
precautions. See Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 664 (4th Cir. 1993)
(stating that plaintiffs licensing of computer programming code to only two recipients,
coupled with its complex system of passwords designed to prevent unauthorized access to the
software, constituted "reasonable precautions" to keep the information secret); Surgidev
Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661, 692-94 (D. Minn. 1986), affd, 828 F.2d 452 (8th
Cir. 1987) (holding that plaintiff took reasonable measures to protect its monofilament
process by forcing its employees to sign secrecy agreements, restricting access to sensitive
areas of its production facility, separating confidential departments from its main research
area, keeping confidential documents in locked files, and providing secret materials only to
those employees who had a special need for the information).
20. Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Tech., Inc., 828 F.2d 452, 455 (8th Cir. 1987).
21. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (1996).
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by improper means, breach of a duty of confidentiality, or unlawful
use of a competitor's trade secret.22
Many actions fall under the umbrella of "improper means," in-
cluding "theft, bribery, misrepresentation [and] espionage through
electronic or other means."2" The prototypical example of such an
improper means scenario took place in E.L duPont deNemours &
Co. v. Christopher,24 a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that
held that photographs of the plaintiffs unfinished production
facility taken by defendant's airplane-done for the unitary purpose
of gaining the plaintiff's trade secrets-constituted an improper
acquisition of trade secrets, even though the defendant's actions
were lawful.25 Thus, to be guilty of misappropriation of trade secrets
through improper means, one's actions need not be illegal, but
simply contrary to accepted norms of business conduct.
A more typical example of trade secret misappropriation in-
volves a breach of a duty of confidentiality, where a party lawfully
acquires information, but is under a duty not to disclose.26 This
occurs most often in the context of an employer-employee relation-
ship, typically involving a duty that-because of non-disclosure
clauses in the employee's contract-lasts beyond the life of the
employment relationship.27 Again, it is not necessary that the
employee gain physical control of the document that details the
trade secret; he merely needs to improperly use knowledge that he
gained from his former employer to be guilty of misappropriation. 28
Improper "use" of a trade secret, the third general way in which
misappropriation occurs, is commonly found in an organization that
22. See Lincicum, supra note 4, at 1259.
23. UNIF. TRADE SECREIS ACT § 1(1) (1996).
24. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970).
25. Id. at 1015-17. Courts have also found improper means to exist in other general
contexts. See Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 212 N.E.2d 865, 869 (Ill. 1965) (stating that the
memorization of confidential information constitutes misappropriation, and that an
"employee may not take with him confidential particularized plans or processes developed
by his employer and disclosed to him while the employer-employee relationship exists ... and
which give the employer advantage over his competitors"); Tennant Co. v. Advance Mach.
Co., 355 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (noting the existence of unlawful behavior
when defendant rummaged through plaintiffs trash).
26. See Lincicum, supra note 4, at 1259.
27. See id. at 1259-60.
28. See Stampede Tool Warehouse, Inc. v. May, 651 N.E.2d 209,217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)
(finding memorization of a customer list to be misappropriation).
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hires a competitor's employee who has left his former employer with
a valuable trade secret at his disposal. The steps a company takes
after the discovery of such information are what may constitute
improper use. Obviously, making exact duplicates of the products
or processes the secret describes constitutes improper use, but the
scope of the rule extends well beyond that action alone.29 Slightly
modifying a rival's trade secret30 or even using the general prin-
ciples set forth in the trade secret to produce a novel product 3"
would each fall under the auspices of trade secret "use," and would
dictate a finding of misappropriation.
3. Remedies Under the UTSA
Remedies under the UTSA are generally confined to injunctions
prohibiting future disclosure and/or use of the trade secret, which
can be issued for either "[a] ctual or threatened misappropriation. 32
Such injunctions often terminate when the trade secret has lost its
veil of secrecy, but "may be continued for an additional reasonable
period of time in order to eliminate commercial advantage that
otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation."3 The
underlying principle of injunctive relief under the UTSA, therefore,
is that one may be enjoined from misappropriating another's trade
secret only so long as is absolutely necessary. Once a trade secret
becomes part of the public domain through general knowledge, or
29. See Matheson, supra note 13, at 150.
30. See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Four Pillars Enter. Co., Nos. 00-4020,00-4128,00-4233,
2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18370, at **19-20 (6th Cir. Sept. 3, 2002) ("(Plaintifil presented
relevant and admissible evidence showing that [defendant] valued, deciphered, modified, and
used [plaintiffs] trade secrets; it was not required to do more."); Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v.
Holden Found. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226, 1239 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[Tlhe fact that [the
defendant] may have altered [the plaintiffs] secret does not insulate it from liability.").
31. See Salsbury Labs., Inc. v. Merieux Labs., Inc., 908 F.2d 706, 713 (11th Cir. 1990)
(holding that because defendant's employees used the "same compounds and steps in the
same order" as they had used while employed by plaintiff, defendant's vaccine production
process was "substantially derived" from plaintiffs process and thus constituted
misappropriation of plaintiffs property).
32. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (1996). The"threatened misappropriation" verbiage
is how the inevitable disclosure doctrine found its way into the ambit of trade secret law. See
infra Part II.A.
33. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 2(a) (1996).
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can be easily discovered through lawful means,34 the injunction
must terminate.
3 5
C. Policy Considerations
A fundamental tension exists in the realm of trade secret law.
On one hand, there lies the strong public policy of encouraging
innovative business advancement through the protection of
essential information."' This is in direct contrast to the almost
sacred right of an American employee to freely change jobs in an
attempt to improve his career standing. 7 The latter of these two
policy concerns is one that pervades the landscape of the American
conscience-as such, it deserves special consideration and will be
discussed briefly.
The doctrine of employment-at-will underlies this freedom of
choice theory, holding that in the absence of a lawful limitation, the
employer-employee relationship may be terminated at the will of
either party.' At its foundation, the doctrine is most concerned
with protecting the rights of both parties to shape the course of
their business or career, whatever the case may be.39 This, in turn,
promotes greater workplace production and economic efficiency by
encouraging both employer and employee to strive to satisfy the
special needs of the other.'
In terms of trade secret jurisprudence, however, the employee's
rights are of special importance. Preventing restrictions on freedom
of job choice is one of the most basic rights that the American
34. For example, a competitor is perfectly within its right to reverse engineer a publicly
offered product in order to determine the "secret' processes that led to its creation. See
RETATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 43 (1995) ("Independent discovery and
analysis of publicly available products or information are not improper means of
acquisition.-).
35. UNIF. TRADE SEcRETS AcT § 2 cmt. (1996).
36. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1268 (7th Cir. 1995).
37. See id.
38. See Matheson, supra note 13, at 152.
39. See id.
40. See id Under this economically driven doctrine, employees will work harder knowing
that they can be let go at the drop of a hat; likewise, employers will offer competitive
packages and salaries, knowing that an employee could easily leave and go to a competitor.
Id. at 152-53.
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laborer enjoys." Yet despite its profound significance, the right is
far from unimpeachable.' Often, either contractual provisions or
judicial intervention infringe upon this sacred right."3
II. THE INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE DOCTRINE
A. Inevitable Disclosure Defined
An accurate definition of the "inevitable disclosure" doctrine
describes the doctrine as the union of enforceable non-compete
clauses and injunctions for threatened misappropriation of trade
secrets, establishing an exceptionally stringent restriction on
employee mobility that has been the subject of much criticism
since its rebirth in 1995." Not specifically addressed by the UTSA,
the doctrine holds that--even in the absence of a non-compete
agreement, or the non-existence of an actual trade secret mis-
appropriation-a former employee may be enjoined from accepting
employment with a competitor because the nature of his new
employment will "inevitably lead him to rely on the [former
employer's] trade secrets."'5
Two striking characteristics of inevitable disclosure warrant
additional preliminary discussion. First, it is important to note that
inevitable disclosure claims are cloaked under the UTSA cover of
"threatened misappropriation," not because the employee intends
to disclose the trade secret, but because of the inevitability that he
will use his personal knowledge of the trade secret in satisfying
the requirements of his new job.'6 This seems at odds with the
41. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (prohibiting involuntary servitude).
42. See Lawrence I. Weinstein, Revisiting the Inevitability Doctrine: When Can a Former
Employee Who Never Signed a Non-Compete Agreement nor Threatened to Use or Disclose
Trade Secrets Be Prohibited from Working fora Competitor?, 21 AM. J. TRIALADVOC. 211,211
(1997) (stating that both courts and parties to a contract may limit this right).
43. See id.
44. See infra Part II.B.
45. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995).
46. Johanna L. Edelstein, Note, Intellectual Slavery?: The Doctrine of Inevitable
Disclosure of Trade Secrets, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 717, 718 n.7 (1996) (stating that
employee who changes jobs within the same field "may find it impossible to avoid drawing
upon the skills and experience she developed at previous jobs').
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functional definition of the word "threat,"'7 not only enjoining
employees who never expressed any intent to disclose, but also
those who even expressly stated that they would not disclose their
former employer's trade secrets. 8 Second, courts that grant in-
junctions in inevitable disclosure cases are in essence creating
judicially crafted covenants not to compete.' 9 This runs contrary to
the most fundamental principles of employment and contract law,
as a contract term--one extremely harmful to the employee and
quite beneficial to the employer-is forced upon the two parties in
the absence of a bargained-for-agreement. 0
B. PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond
1. The Case
The modern formulation of the inevitable disclosure doctrine is
rooted in the Seventh Circuit's landmark 1995 decision in PepsiCo.,
Inc. v. Redmond. Though previous application of the doctrine was
by no means unprecedented,51 scholars widely credit PepsiCo for
bringing the doctrine back to the forefront of trade secret law,5" as
it was perhaps the first case in which a court applied the doctrine
to an employment relationship lacking a covenant not to compete.53
47. Definitions of "threat" include "a statement or expression of intention to hurt,
destroy, punish, etc., as in retaliation or intimidation," WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL
UNABRIDGEDDICTIONARY 1901 (2d ed., 1979), and "[al communicated intent to inflictphysical
or other harm on any person or on property." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1327 (5th ed. 1979).
48. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270. In PepsiCo, the defendant (Redmond) had actually signed
a non-disclosure agreement with his former employer (Pepsi), stating that he would "not ...
disclose any trade secrets or confidential information gleaned from his earlier employment."
Id.
49. See Matheson, supra note 13, at 159.
50. See id. ("The original employer obtains the benefit of a non-compete restriction
without bargaining for it or paying for it.").
51. See, e.g., AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1987); Teradyne, Inc. v.
Clear Communications Corp., 707 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. II. 1989); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v.
Continental Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Mich. 1966); E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d 428 (Del. Ch. 1964); B.F. Goodrich
Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963). In each of these cases, the court
used inevitable disclosure to assess the validity of a non-compete agreement.
52. See Lincicum, supra note 4, at 1260.
53. See PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1262.
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Set against the backdrop of "fierce beverage-industry com-
petition" in the sports drink and "new age" drink fields, PepsiCo
centered around the activities of the defendant William Redmond,
a former PepsiCo managerial executive who had left to join the
Quaker Oats Company in 1994."' PepsiCo and Quaker were rivals
in the two beverage markets, markets largely dominated by
Quaker's "Gatorade" and "Snapple" drinks, respectively.55 Despite
Quaker's dominance, PepsiCo had plans in place to challenge
Quaker's impressive market standing, introducing the sports drink
"All Sport" in 1994 and entering the new age drink field through
joint ventures with Ocean Spray and Lipton.5"
Redmond was a high-ranking executive in PepsiCo's North
America (PCNA) division, and recently had been promoted to
General Manager of a PepsiCo business unit that encompassed the
entire state of California and had annual revenues of over five
hundred million dollars, or approximately one-fifth of PCNA's profit
in the United States.5"
In this high-level capacity, Redmond was privy to a wealth of
"inside information and trade secrets" that PepsiCo wanted
protected.' This information included (1) PCNA's "Strategic Plan,"
a frequently-revised document outlining PCNA's financial and
strategic goals for the upcoming three-year period, (2) an "Annual
Operating Plan" containing crucial information on how PCNA's
products would be priced in the market, (3) general knowledge of
"attack plans," detailing high-level strategies for specific markets,
and (4) knowledge of special prototypes designed to improve
PCNA's selling and delivery systems. 9
Redmond negotiated with Quaker from May through November
1994, keeping the negotiations secret from his PCNA colleagues
throughout the process.60 On November 8, he accepted a position as
Vice President of Field Operations for Quaker's Gatorade division,
and quickly informed a PCNA superior that he had received an offer
54. Id. at 1262, 1263-64 (7th Cir. 1995).
55. Id. at 1264.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1265-66.
60. Id. at 1264.
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from Quaker, but had not yet accepted it.6" He made similar
misrepresentations to his other co-workers and superiors in the pe-
riod that followed, not divulging to PCNA his acceptance of the
Quaker offer until November 10.62
Shortly thereafter, PepsiCo filed a diversity suit against
Redmond that aimed specifically to prevent him from beginning his
employment with Quaker. 63 The district court granted this re-
quest and issued a preliminary injunction on December 15, 1994,
enjoining Redmond from assuming his duties at Quaker for six
months, and preventing him from using or disclosing any of PCNA's
confidential information of which he had knowledge.6 4
On appeal, the parties presented ample evidence supporting their
positions. PepsiCo argued that, by virtue of Redmond's "extensive
and intimate knowledge about [its] strategic goals for 1995 in sports
drinks and new age drinks," he inevitably would disclose its trade
secrets if he assumed his new position with Quaker.6" They con-
tended that he "cannot help but rely on PCNA trade secrets as he
helps plot Gatorade and Snapple's new course," and that his
knowledge of such secrets would give Quaker an unfair advantage
in the battle for supremacy in the sport drink and new age drink
markets.6 6
In response, Redmond and Quaker presented many facts that
they believed would counter PepsiCo's assertion of inevitable
disclosure. First, they explained that Redmond's chief respon-
sibilities with Quaker would involve the integration of Gatorade
and Snapple distribution processes, an implementation effort that
would be managed according to a pre-devised plan.67 This, coupled
with the wholly disparate nature of Quaker and PCNA's distri-
bution methods, would render his knowledge of PCNA's confidential
strategies irrelevant.68 Second, the defendants noted that Redmond
had signed a confidentiality agreement with Quaker, forbidding
him from disclosing any secret information that was the property
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1265.
64. Id. at 1267.
65. Id. at 1269.
66. Id. at 1270.
67. Id. at 1266.
68. Id.
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of another party.69 Third, Redmond and Quaker made the express
statement at trial that they had no intention of using any confi-
dential information Redmond may have gained at PepsiCo, even
giving the assurance that-should he ever find himself confronted
with a situation that may implicate his knowledge of PepsiCo's
trade secrets-he would seek the counsel of Quaker's in-house legal
team before proceeding any further.7 0
The Court of Appeals disagreed. Applying the tenets of the
Illinois Trade Secrets Act (ITSA)," the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the trial court's preliminary injunction and effectively prohibited
Redmond from assuming his new employment with Quaker. In
reaching its holding, the court used the "threatened" mis-
appropriation verbiage of the ITSA as its guide, arguing that the
"demonstrated inevitability" that Redmond would rely on his
knowledge of PCNA trade secrets in his new capacity constituted a
viable "threat" to PepsiCo's confidential information. 2
Mindful of the importance of protecting a worker's right to pursue
a livelihood,73 the PepsiCo court nonetheless established three
elements for a successful showing of inevitable disclosure, pro-
viding a crystallized paradigm for other courts to follow. First, the
new employee must have "extensive and intimate knowledge" of
his former employer's trade secrets.7' In the case at hand, it
seemed fairly evident to all involved that Redmond's knowledge of
PCNA's trade secrets was substantial. Second, the employee's new
position must consist of substantially similar requirements and
69. Id. Though not stressed by the defense, Redmond had also signed a non-disclosure
agreement with PepsiCo stating that he would "not disclose at any time, to anyone other
than officers or employees of [PepsiCo], or make use of, confidential information relating to
the business of [PepsiCo] ... obtained while in the employ of (PepsiCo], which shall not be
generally known or available to the public or recognized as standard practice." Id. at 1264
(alteration in original).
70. Id. at 1266, 1270.
71. The ITSA is Illinois' version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and is virtually
identical in nearly every respect. See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/1-1065/9 (West 2003).
72. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1271.
73. Id. at 1268. The court acknowledged the tension that exists in trade secret law, one
in which a balance must be struck between upholding "standards of commercial morality"
and upholding an employee's right to work where he chooses. It further noted that "[tihis
tension is particularly exacerbated when a plaintiff sues to prevent not the actual
misappropriation of trade secrets but the mere threat that it will occur." Id. (emphasis
added).
74. Id. at 1269.
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responsibilities as the old position.75 Here, the court felt that the
Quaker and PepsiCo jobs were sufficiently alike to satisfy this
threshold, noting that Redmond "could not help but rely" on the
confidential information he acquired at PepsiCo at his new job with
Quaker, primarily because of the similarity of the work.76 Finally,
the court looked at the trustworthiness of the employee as a third
factor, specifically whether he could be trusted not to use or
disclose the trade secrets." The district court found Redmond's
lack of candor and forthrightness to be probative of whether he
would honor his confidentiality agreements, and this conclusion
considerably colored the Court of Appeals' decision to uphold the
injunction.7"
2. Criticisms of PepsiCo
Critics have identified many aspects of the PepsiCo decision as
particularly discomforting. Perhaps the most highly criticized
aspect was the court's reliance on Redmond's less-than-straight-
forward dealings with PepsiCo as a key determinant in its
application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine. This reliance is
troubling on two fronts. First, it demonstrates an underlying
paradox in the overarching structure of the court's reasoning. 79The
court characterized Redmond's disclosure of PepsiCo's trade secrets
as an inevitability.8 0 By its very definition, "inevitable" implies a
happening that is "[ilmpossible to avoid or prevent.""' It is difficult
to understand how evidence of bad faith on Redmond's part
impacted something that was bound to happen anyway. This
inherent conflict suggests that the court's characterization of trade
secret disclosure as "inevitable" is somewhat of a misnomer, and
casts serious doubt on the validity of its general rationale. Second,
the district court's determination that Redmond's lack of forth-
rightness with PepsiCo necessarily implied a "willingness to misuse
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1270.
77. Id.
78. See Lincicum, supra note 4, at 1262-63.
79. See id. at 1262 ("If there was a 'demonstrated inevitability' that Redmond was going
to reveal PCNA trade secrets, why was his lack of candor relevant?").
80. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1271.
81. THE AMERiCAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 695 (3d ed. 1997).
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PCNA trade secrets"8 2 carried too much weight in the court's
ultimate holding.8" It is quite uncertain, in fact, whether Redmond
exhibited any bad faith at all. The simple fact that he withheld
evidence of negotiations with Quaker during the months preceding
his acceptance of the Quaker offer is not uncommon in the business
world, and may speak more to Redmond's unwillingness to agitate
his current employer than to any deliberate misbehavior. Redmond
simply may have wanted to keep his options open in the event that
negotiations with Quaker deteriorated. Moreover, as the court itself
noted, Redmond's exaggerations about the prestige of the position
he was considering taking with Quaker-even after his acceptance
of the Quaker offer-easily could be considered nothing more than
a bargaining ploy, and perfectly within acceptable business stan-
dards and mores. 4 How the court, without qualification, could
correlate this with an uncompromising willingness to damage his
long-time employer is quite unsettling."5
Another critique of the PepsiCo decision concerns its overly broad
scope. 6 Traditionally, courts only applied the inevitable disclosure
doctrine in cases involving highly technical industries, where
extremely complex formulas and algorithms were the norm.87
PepsiCo expanded the reach of the doctrine to include non-technical
industries, prohibiting an employee from switching jobs not to
82. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1270.
83. See Weinstein, supra note 42, at 225 (noting how the district court's finding of a
correlation between Redmond's dishonest behavior and the likelihood of his use or disclosure
of PCNA trade secrets impacted the PepsiCo court, and stating that "it is unclear whether
the injunction would have been affirmed without such a finding").
84. PepsiCo, 54 F.3d at 1271 ("Redmond's ambiguous behavior toward his PepsiCo
superiors might have been nothing more than an attempt to gain leverage in employment
negotiations.").
85. See Weinstein, supra note 42, at 225.
86. See Brandy L. Treadway, Comment, An Overview of Individual States'Application
of Inevitable Disclosure: Concrete Doctrine orEquitable Tool, 55 SMUL. REv. 621,625 (2002).
87. See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Continental Aviation & Eng'g Corp., 255 F. Supp.
645 (E.D. Mich. 1966); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Am. Potash & Chem. Corp., 200 A.2d
428 (Del. Ch. 1964); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Wohlgemuth, 192 N.E.2d 99 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963).
Each of these cases adhered to a consistent scenario: Plaintiff had achieved great success in
a technical industry, chiefly due to the proliferation of technology that its competitors did not
have. As a result, a competitor hired away one of plaintiffs highly skilled employees to
narrow the gap between the two companies. See Weinstein, supra note 42, at 223 (noting that
"notwithstanding the absence of a non-compete agreement, an injunction restraining
competitive employment was necessary as a practical matter to protect the former employer's
trade secrets").
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prevent the disclosure of complicated technical research, but-as
was the case in PepsiCo-to prevent the disclosure of marketing
plans and business strategies, information that conforms to a more
uniform set of standards available to all.88
Some have argued further that the PepsiCo court failed to devote
the proper attention to the actual marketing and distribution trade
secrets at play in the case.89 Though brought up by the defense, the
court quickly dismissed the fact that PepsiCo and Quaker were
direct competitors in the beverage market, and as such employed
drastically divergent marketing strategies and distribution meth-
ods.9° Morever, the fact that Quaker was the unquestioned leader
in the industry seems to diminish the value of PepsiCo's business
plans in the context of Redmond's employment with Quaker-in
other words, it is unlikely that an industry giant, already successful
in the market, would be able to use this type of information to make
itself more successful.9' Though it is possible, it is unlikely, not only
making a finding of inevitable disclosure dubious, but also bringing
into question whether the trade secrets were useful to Quaker at
all. The court devoted little time to this proposition in its decision.92
C. Criticisms of the Doctrine
Since its rebirth in 1995, the inevitable disclosure doctrine has
been the subject of much criticism, reflecting its tenuous hold on its
status as a viable legal theory. These criticisms have manifested
themselves in many forms, from commentary on how the doctrine
has been misapplied to discussions detailing the adverse practical
effects brought about by the application of such a doctrine. John
Matheson, in a 1998 article, lays out a number of the doctrine's
defects, ultimately concluding that-in the absence of an express
88. See Treadway, supra note 86, at 625.
89. See Weinstein, supra note 42, at 226.
90. See id. ("[W]hile there may be situations where an executive's knowledge of a former
employer's marketing-related secrets would inevitably be used were the executive to engage
in the same activities for a competitor, that is not the norm.").
91. Weinstein points out that PepsiCo simply does not fit into the typical scenario, where
the new employer is unsuccessful "precisely because it lacks the trade secret technology that
the old employer possesses and which the new hire knew intimately," and denounces the
court for its unfounded dismissal of this argument. Id.
92. See id.
410 [Vol. 45:395
2003] INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE THROUGH AN INTERNET LENS 411
covenant not to compete-there is no place for inevitable disclosure
in the modern business world.93
Perhaps the most critical aspect of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine is the aforementioned fact that a court's application of the
doctrine creates judicially mandated ex post facto covenants not to
compete. Matheson expands the scope of this critique by explaining
that such application results in the unjust revision of not one, but
two employment agreements.94 First, the principal amendment
occurs in terms of the contract between the employee and her
original employer, as an injunction prohibiting the employee from
seeking new employment effectively adds a new non-compete
provision to the original agreement.95 Such a rewriting is funda-
mentally unfair. A non-compete clause represents a tremendous
advantage for any employer, and an employee who signs one most
certainly would seek additional compensation at the bargaining
table. By fashioning a pseudo non-compete clause at the injunction
stage, the employer essentially gets something for free, and the
employee is stuck with a contract for which he did not bargain.
Second, the agreement between the employee and his new employer
is rewritten as well, as the terms of any prospective contract
are essentially negated.9" With the employee prohibited (at least
initially) from assuming the duties of his new employment, the
terms of the new contract suddenly do not adequately reflect for
what the employer has paid-that is, an employee hired to work
in a specific capacity who is not subject to any contractual
encumbrances .9
Furthermore, Matheson argues that the fundamental unfairness
inherent in these contract revisions is not the end of the story
-rather, application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine has the
additional effect of "creat[ing] significant uncertainty in the labor
93. Matheson, supra note 13, at 160-65.
94. See id. at 160.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 160-61. Matheson finds unreasonable a solution that would order the new
employer to simply put the employee in a different position within the organization. For an
example of this, see IBM Corp. u. Seagate Tech., No. 3-91-630, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20406,
at *15 (D. Minn. Dec. 31, 1991) (limiting an employee to an area within new employer's
company where disclosure of trade secrets would not be inevitable). Again, this is not what
the employer bargained for when it hired the employee. See Matheson, supra note 13, at 161.
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market."8 This uncertainty is manifested first in the time-sensitive
nature of inevitable disclosure jurisprudence generally. An em-
ployer that has failed to protect itself through a non-compete clause
has an unquestioned incentive to seek a preliminary injunction
prohibiting its former employee from assuming his new duties at
another company.99 Though courts grant preliminary injunctions
based only on the likelihood of success on the merits of the case, 1 °
and not on any actual misconduct, a company that successfully
enjoins a former employee pending trial essentially gets what it
desired. It often takes months to move from the preliminary
injunction stage up to and through the completion of the trial
-thus, no matter what the outcome, the employee has lost valuable
compensation and experience that he could have gained at his new
place of employment.10'
Moreover, new employers mindful of the inevitable disclosure
doctrine are faced with the unwelcome realization that a potential
employee may be restricted not only by the terms of his former
employment contract-itself a deterrent to hire the worker-but
also by the potential for costly litigation that may occur through an
inevitable disclosure action by the former employer, a "hidden" cost
that employers must take into consideration before hiring the
employee.'0 2 The net result is a market that is faced with the
uncertain prospect of expensive litigation, a result that hampers not
just the principal parties involved, but the economy as a whole."0 3
98. Matheson, supra note 13, at 161.
99. Id.
100. See FED. R. CIv. P. 65; see also Am. Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hosp. Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d
589,593(7th Cir. 1986) (holding that courts should grant preliminary injunctions if, and only
if, "the harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is denied, multiplied by the probability that the
denial would be an error ... exceeds the harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted,
multiplied by the probability that granting the injunction would be an error").
101. See Matheson, supra note 13, at 161 ("The former employer that has not protected
itself in advance has an incentive to seek injunctive relief .... Even if it loses, the former
employer has hampered the former employee and the new employer through the cloud of the
litigation process.").
102. See id.
103. See id. ("Workers lose through lost opportunities, and the economy loses by decreased
competition, which can lead ultimately to higher consumer prices in the market."); see also
Edelstein, supra note 46, at 719 ("[Gleneral acceptance of the inevitable disclosure theory
could have a serious impact on a wide range of industries, stifling the dissemination of
general technical knowledge and economic growth.").
412 [Vol. 45:395
20031 INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE THROUGH AN INTERNET LENS 413
III. INEVITABLE DISCLOSURE AND THE INTERNET
A. Trade Secrets and the Internet
For a variety of reasons, issues surrounding trade secret
management, protection, and misappropriation play a heightened
role in the context of the Internet industry compared to other
business sectors. Chief among these reasons is the ease with
which potentially confidential information can be viewed and
disseminated via the Internet. This is evident in many contexts,
ranging from trade secrets transmitted through e-mail to those
posted-either intentionally or unintentionally-on Web pages.l°4
Confidential information posted on the World Wide Web raises
interesting trade secret issues unique to the Internet industry,
10 5
issues that go to the very core of whether the requirements for the
mere existence of a trade secret have been satisfied. The key
question in such scenarios is whether protection for an otherwise
legitimate trade secret is eliminated by its accessibility on the
Internet. Accessibility by way of the Internet seems to impinge on
the crucial requirements of secrecy that are central to trade secret
law-specifically, the necessity that the information itself be
incapable of discovery by lawful means, and the condition that the
organization wishing to preserve the confidentiality of the material
take reasonable steps to maintain its secrecy. 0 6 Some have argued
the alternative, contending that no causal link necessarily exists
104. See Francis J. Burke, Jr., et al., Protecting Trade Secrets in a Digital World, in SIXTH
ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 467, 494-95 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, &
Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. GO-OOZE, 2002) (suggesting a variety of
safeguards that a technology company should use to protect its confidential information from
being sent by employees via e-mail, including: (1) enforcing and reinforcing confidentiality
agreements with employees to keep them aware of the critical nature of certain information;
(2) requiring vendors to sign confidentiality agreements if necessary; (3) setting up company
e-mail policies that allow monitoring of all employee e-mails; and (4) prohibiting the
transmission of any company file to an e-mail account outside the organization without
managerial approval); see also People v. Eubanks, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 846, 847-48 (Ct. App.
1995) (dealing with a criminal investigation against a former employee for the alleged theft
of trade secrets through e-mail transmissions).
105. See Ian C. Ballon, Copyright, Digital Entertainment and the Impact of New
Technologies: A Primer, in SIXTH ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE 9, 93 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. GO-OOZE, 2002)
thereinafter Ballon, Primer].
106. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
between information posted on the Internet and the worldwide
dissemination of such information. 7 In other words, the fact that
the material was-in theory-available to anyone who had Internet
access does not imply automatically that it was, in fact, accessed.18
Factors such as the popularity of the Web address and the length
of time that the information was posted should play a role in
determining whether classification of the information as a secret
has been defeated or whether reasonable steps have been taken to
assure its secrecy. 09 Recent case law has effected an opposite
result, however, as many courts have held that any posting on the
Internet immediately makes the information widely known--either
actually or constructively-and destroys the existence of the trade
secret.110
B. Inevitable Disclosure and the Internet Industry
1. Inevitable Disclosure Factors Unique to the Internet
Though ease of access and dissemination separates the Internet
field from other industries in relation to trade secret law and policy,
perhaps the greatest divergence occurs in the context of the
inevitable disclosure doctrine. This is the scenario in which an
employee leaves one Internet-based company for another and is
thought to be in a position to "inevitably disclose" the first com-
pany's trade secrets. Inevitable disclosure is particularly mean-
ingful in the Internet industry because of (1) its dynamic nature,
illustrated by the expeditious manner in which new technologies
come and go, and (2) its exceedingly broad scope, evident from the
107. See Ballon, Primer, supra note 105, at 93.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 897 F. Supp. 260, 266 (E.D.Va. 1995) (refusing to
provide protection to church documents that had "escaped into the public domain and onto
the Internet"); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. F.A.C.T.Net, Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1519, 1526 (D. Colo.
1995) (holding that no trade secret protection was available to documents that had entered
the public domain, because "portions of the Works have been made available on the Internet
... with the potential for downloading by countless users"); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-
Line Communication Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1256 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("While the court
is persuaded by the Church's evidence that those who made the original postings likely
gained the information through improper means ... this does not negate the finding that, once
posted, the works lost their secrecy.").
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Internet's worldwide accessibility concerning typical business
models, such as advertising and marketing strategies.
The Internet field is perhaps the most fast-paced and dynamic
industry in the United States."' Numerous new technologies are
created with unprecedented speed, and companies that do not move
quickly often are not around to see the fruits of their labor. As a
result, Internet organizations often try to "buy" a competitor's
confidential technological acumen by stealing its most important
employees and offering them exorbitant compensation." 2 Moreover,
it is highly probable that a given Internet technology "may be
primarily or exclusively associated with a single employer.""' In
such an environment, it seems clear that applying inevitable
disclosure in cases where no non-compete clause exists makes
perfect sense and is accomplished easily. The prevalence of such
"underhanded" dealings, coupled with the small window of time in
which cutting-edge technology is at its maximum value (before it is
replaced quickly by a new and improved technology), seems to imply
that enjoining an employee from working for a competitor for a
short period of time is at least more equitable than it would be in
other industries."' Put another way, courts may feel more com-
fortable issuing injunctions for a brief period of time, knowing with
a greater degree of certainty that the value of the Internet-
technology trade secret will be diminished greatly within a period
of months, or even weeks. Though the usual objections to inevitable
disclosure still apply in this context, such as creating judicially
crafted non-compete clauses and restricting employee mobility,"'
111. See, e.g., Jim Chen, The Authority to Regulate Broadband Internet Access over Cable,
16 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 677,714-15 (2001) (discussing the growth and dynamic nature of the
Internet industry, and the FCC's contention that its policy of "unregulation" was the catalyst
for such growth).
112. See Ian C. Ballon, The Internet Applications of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, in
CYBERSPACE LAW. 2 (Feb. 1998) [hereinafter Ballon, Internet Applications].
113. See id. at 6.
114. See id.; see also DoubleClick, Inc. v. Henderson, No. 116914/97, 1997 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 577, at *23 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 5, 1997) (determining that a one-year period for an
injunction in an Internet-related case was too long because "[gliven the speed with which the
Internet advertising industry apparently changes, defendant's knowledge ... will likely lose
value to such a degree that the purpose of a preliminary injunction will have evaporated
before the year is up").
115. See supra Part II.C.
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they seem less powerful when aimed at the Internet industry
because of its dynamic and temporal nature.11
This accelerated concept of time also plays a role in how courts
could apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine to trade secrets that
involve Internet-related business models.117 Because of the fast-
paced nature of the industry, many newly conceived companies (and
presumably some established ones) do not have a reliable and
accurate system of documenting their trade secrets, particularly
those that involve business plans.118 As a result, important assets
such as marketing strategies and customer lists often are not given
the same level of protection as technological innovations, and thus
are rendered useless as trade secrets, making inevitable disclosure
claims inconsequential.
Additionally, the all-encompassing scope of the Internet, par-
ticularly in relation to business plans, makes application of the
doctrine particularly troublesome, especially in the area of fash-
ioning appropriate remedies. The problem lies in the scope of
competition among Internet companies--competition not confined
by geographic and subject matter constraints like many non-
Internet businesses. This is best illustrated by way of an example:
Suppose employee A is a high-level executive for a major inter-
national online sales outlet, company B, in charge of developing
Internet-related marketing strategies for the company. 9 The
organization sells nearly everything imaginable-books, games,
videos, clothes, etc. Employee A has signed a confidentiality agree-
ment, but did not sign a non-compete clause. After departing the
116. One could also argue that because of the dynamic nature of the industry, companies
have an increased responsibility to require new employees to sign non-compete clauses.
117. See Ballon, Internet Applications, supra note 112, at 4-6 (discussing the concept of
"Internet Time" and how it relates to remedies in inevitable disclosure cases).
118. See id. Ballon discusses the fact that, because of the hurried pace of Internet time,
.many emerging companies do not adequately document their trade secrets," and explains:
This is especially true when the secrets constitute business plans, since unlike
technology (which may be patentable), the value of marketing and other
business information as intellectual property may not be fully appreciated by
the owners of rapidly growing companies. In addition, many businesses
maintain electronic records, which are frequently updated but not necessarily
retained at specific historic moments which would be relevant in litigation.
Id. at 4.
119. For our purposes, analogizing company B to an outfit such as Amazon.com is
particularly helpful.
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company for another online sales organization, A's former employer
(B) sues him, invoking the inevitable disclosure doctrine as B's
smoking gun in litigation. How would a court deal with such a
scenario?
As PepsiCo and other courts that have applied the doctrine have
enunciated, one of the main requirements for a finding of inevitable
disclosure is that the former job and the current job must be
substantially similar. In other words, the two organizations must
be direct competitors for the doctrine to be relevant. 0 In terms of
this Note's example, however, such a requirement is rendered
almost meaningless. EmployeeA conceivably could be enjoined from
developing marketing strategies for any online business that sells
any product that company B sells. Because the breadth of company
B's sales base is so great, this eliminates a tremendous percentage
of the employment available to a person with employee A's skills.
Given the worldwide geographic scope of the Internet (it is available
to anyone, anywhere, and at any time), a court cannot fashion an
injunction prohibiting employeeA from working within a fifty-mile,
hundred-mile, statewide, or even nationwide radius of company B,
as it could in a non-Internet business context. Further, company B
could argue that a court could prevent employee A from doing
marketing work for any Internet company (not just those that sell
the same products as company B) because of employee A's unique
and peculiar knowledge of Internet-specific marketing techniques.
This, again, eliminates a tremendous segment of the business
community for employee A's future employment prospects,
realistically preventing him from changing jobs, and placing an
incredible burden on his right to pursue his own labor. As a result,
this "direct competition" component factor that courts consider in
determining the validity of an inevitable disclosure claim is unfairly
weighted in favor of the employer, making its use as a neutral
factor nearly obsolete.
Much as courts improperly weigh the degree of competition factor
in favor of the employer in Internet-related disputes, the role of bad
faith or misconduct, which often can aid the employee acting in
120. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269-70 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing the
argument that Redmond could not help but to rely on the knowledge he gained at PepsiCo
in performing his new job).
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good faith in inevitable disclosure cases, is similarly skewed.'2 ' In
Internet industries, where technology is more likely temporary
than permanent, competitors often hire away employees for the
unabashedly express purpose of accomplishing projects for which
they do not have the appropriate personnel and resources. In doing
so, commentators have argued, it is beyond question that the
departing employee will rely on his former company's trade secrets,
because that was what he was hired to do, even though he had
signed a confidentiality agreement, and even though he had not
exhibited any prior bad faith in his dealings with his former
company. 122
2. DoubleClick, Inc. v. Henderson
Much like in other disciplines, there is no clear standard on how
to apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine within the ambit of
Internet-related industries. One of the more notable examples of a
court confronting an Internet industry application of the doctrine
that highlights this ambiguity is the New York case DoubleClick,
Inc. v. Henderson."2 An in-depth look at the case will help to illus-
trate the peculiar facets of the Internet that one must consider in
a thorough analysis of the doctrine.
In DoubleClick, the court granted a preliminary injunction in
favor of the plaintiff, an online advertising organization, prohibiting
two former company vice-presidents (defendants Dickey and
Henderson) from competing with the organization for a period of six
121. See Ballon, Internet Applications, supra note 112, at 4 (asserting that employee
misconduct should be irrelevant in many Internet-related cases).
122. See id. In his discussion of the diminished role of misconduct in Internet inevitable
disclosure cases, Ballon notes:
Evidence of some motivation for future disclosure also should be unnecessary
in cases involving Internet-related industries where technology is rapidly
changing and a new employer, by hiring a particular employee, may in reality
be purchasing valuable lead-time to develop a competing product. In such cases,
evidence of prior misconduct or a predisposition towards disclosure should not
be required if the plaintiff can establish that merely by assuming a competing
position the former employee inevitably would use or rely upon plaintiffs trade
secrets.
Id.
123. No. 116914/97, 1997 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 577 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 5, 1997).
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months. 124 The employment relationship was typical of the kind of
inevitable disclosure cases that are the subject of this Note: Both
employees had signed confidentiality agreements, and neither-in
essence-had entered into any noncompete agreement. 12 Before
his departure, one defendant was privy to a wealth of confidential
DoubleClick information-the company's 1996 Business Plan,
revenue projections, designs on future projects, various pricing and
product strategies, and important client lists. The other defendant
had knowledge of all of this information, and additionally was
exposed to extremely confidential documents distributed only to
high-level management. 12 , While still employed at DoubleClick,
both defendants worked to start their own competing Internet
advertising firm, creating a business plan and soliciting both in-
vestors and customers.
127
In granting the injunction, the court's analysis concerning the
inevitability of the defendants' disclosure of DoubleClick's trade
secrets was based on two key factors."2 First, the defendants' bad
faith-the fact that they blatantly sought to start their own
competing online advertising agency while still employed at
DoubleClick-quite obviously had an impact on the court's
findings. 1" Second, the court stressed the competitive nature of
the Internet industry, saying that "[tihere is evidence ... that the
Internet advertising business is an extremely competitive one,
with a variety of companies using different software and sales
techniques to maximize the effectiveness of its clients' adver-
tising."3 0 In such an environment, the court reasoned, the defen-
dants' disclosure and use of DoubleClick's trade secrets was
inevitable; given "the centrality of [the defendants] in DoubleClick's
124. Id. at **23-24.
125. Id. at **4-5. One of the defendants entered into a non-compete agreement that the
court found inapplicable to the facts of the case. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at *6.
128. Id. at **23-24. Though the court's injunction prohibited Dickey and Henderson from
running a competing firm for six months, they were not prevented from working in the
Internet advertising field, subject to one limitation: "Nothing herein shall be construed to
prevent defendants from working for any employer that competes with DoubleClick, so long
as defendants' job description(s) or functions with such employer do not include providing
advice or information concerning any aspect of advertising on the Internet." Id. at *24.
129. See id. at *17 (discussing the defendants' "cavalier attitude').
130. Id. at *4.
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operations," it was "unlikely that they could eradicate [Double
Click'sl secrets from [their] minds."'
The court's apparent reliance on the defendants' misconduct in
DoubleClick seems to be at odds with the arguments set forth
above, specifically, the assertion that the role of bad faith and
misconduct is diminished in Internet cases.3 2 Though it is not
contradictory, it does require some qualification. It seems clear
after DoubleClick that bad faith on the part of any defendant in any
inevitable disclosure case will color a court's decision, at least to
some extent. Unlike in other industries, however, one could argue
that a lack of bad faith has no bearing on a court's finding of
inevitable disclosure, given the dynamic nature of the Internet
industry and the high rate of employee turnover.'33 It seems likely,
then, that even if the defendants in DoubleClick had waited until
they left DoubleClick before beginning plans to start their own
company, the case would have come out the same way.
C. Proposal for Inevitable Disclosure Application in the Internet
Arena
Application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine has been met
with much criticism in many contexts; this criticism is only
heightened in cases where the parties have not entered into a non-
compete agreement. In the framework of the Internet industry,
such criticism is not diminished by any means.3 4 The same issues
that plague application of the doctrine in other areas persist in
the Internet arena: creating judge-mandated covenants not to com-
pete, effecting great uncertainty in the labor market, and unduly
restricting employee mobility, among others." However, because
of the dynamic and often fleeting nature of the Internet industry
and the critical nature of the confidential information it spawns,
131. Id. at *16.
132. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., EarthWeb, Inc. v. Schlack, 71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(arguing that "in its purest form, the inevitable disclosure doctrine treads an exceedingly
narrow path through judicially disfavored territory" and scrutinizing each of the risks
inherent in applying the doctrine).
135. See supra Part II.C.
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there is a greater need to protect trade secrets in the Internet
realm.
This Note argues that in an Internet-related trade secret case,
application of the doctrine in the absence of a non-compete
agreement is necessary, but only in an extremely strict and
contrived form-namely, a proposed three fold process that courts
should use when deciding when and how to apply inevitable
disclosure. First, courts should apply the doctrine narrowly, only in
cases that fit a specific factual scenario, one that depends on
whether the trade secret is strictly technical or involves more
general business information. Second, if such application is
warranted, any injunction enjoining an employee from accepting
employment elsewhere should be restricted by concrete limits on its
duration and scope. Finally, if the court grants an injunction,
former employers should be required to compensate the departing
employee in light of the harsh restrictions on his ability to pursue
his own labor that the injunction causes.
1. Narrowly Apply the Doctrine
Assuming that the plaintiff has established the existence of a
trade secret, the first step of this process is to narrowly tailor an
application of the doctrine to a very specific combination of facts,
limiting the doctrine's purview to cases in which a highly critical
employee departs from his former organization to work for one of its
direct competitors. In terms of the Internet industry, the two core
terms of this guideline-"highly critical" and "direct competitor"-
will be characterized differently, depending on whether the trade
secret at issue is one involving a business model, or one involving
Internet-specific technical know-how.
If the trade secret itself is a business model, such as marketing
plans, advertising strategies, or pricing and product specifications,
then "highly critical" is most closely analogous to "highly ranked."
In this respect, only high-level managers and supervisors who have
the most intimate knowledge of general company business strat-
egies and forecasts should be caught in the doctrine's web. Other
employees who are privy to certain confidential business plans
would not be affected by the same restriction, and would be free to
pursue employment elsewhere without fear of being enjoined by
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their former employer because of the "inevitability" of them relying
on this knowledge at their new place of employment. l 6 Courts
must also define narrowly the second requirement-that the new
employer be a "direct competitor" of the former one when dealing
with Internet trade secrets that are business plans. As discussed
earlier, the enhanced scope of Internet sales and services-where
business strategies most often come to the forefront-makes many
organizations, which otherwise would not be in the same market in
other contexts, competitors in the Internet arena. 137 For example,
a small chain of bookstores in the Northeastern United States
typically would not be considered a direct competitor of a Western
department store that happens to sell books. In the Internet
medium, however, such organizations hypothetically could be com-
peting for customers, because both companies' Web sites would be
equally accessible to the public at large. This is where the meaning
of "direct" must be restricted to include only organizations that offer
substantially the same products or services (both quantitatively
and qualitatively) and whose consumer markets are similar in
geographical scope.33 Thus, an online bookstore based in and
selling chiefly to the Northeastern United States would not be
considered a direct competitor of an online bookstore based in and
selling chiefly to the Western United States, because at a consumer
level, they are in different geographic markets. Courts could
ascertain such information rather easily, simply by looking at each
organization's list of customers and determining the predominant
area of the country where those customers live. In a case where
both companies have a national consumer base, they could still be
restricted by the "substantial similarity" requirement. Hence, a
national online "department store" such as Amazon.com would not
be considered a direct competitor of a national online bookstore
such as Barnes&Noble.com. Although they both are the same in
terms of consumer geographical scope, their products are quan-
titatively not the same, even though Amazon.com sells books.
136. Remember, however, that the trade secret still cannot be disclosed. If the former
employer can prove that the employee threatened to disclose the trade secret, then a court
may still enjoin the employee.
137. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
138. This has the effect of helping to narrow the scope of the inevitable disclosure doctrine
in Internet cases, tremendously reducing the magnitude of the doctrine's effect.
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Through this and the aforementioned limitations, the breadth of the
inevitable disclosure doctrine in cases involving trade secrets that
are Internet-related business models would be reduced signifi-
cantly.
Internet trade secrets that involve strictly computer technology
require a different approach. In this instance, deciding whether to
apply the doctrine necessitates a different formulation of the terms
"highly critical" and "direct competitor." Because Internet tech-
nology typically crosses over from industry to industry and enjoys
limited field-specific application, the definition of "direct compet-
itor" must be broadened here to include, at least as an initial
matter; any two companies that produce or develop similar
technology. The labor and expertise that must go into developing
new Internet technology, coupled with its excessively temporal
nature, require that the quantitative "substantially similar"
approach suggested for business models should be discarded in
the case of technology. Thus, a large organization that develops
technology X as one of a myriad of web-development technologies
would be considered a direct competitor with a small organization
that develops technology X only, even though the general view
would be that they are not truly competitors in the same market. It
is important to remember, however, that the typical trade secret
issues that occur in Internet technology cases involve technologies
that have not been developed yet.1" 9 In other words, an employee
who brings to a new company preliminary notes and outlines for a
cutting-edge Internet technology is being brought over primarily to
develop that new technology as quickly as possible; that is, before
the former employer fully develops it. Thus, being a "direct
competitor" takes on an almost nonexistent role in this instance,
the key determinant instead being whether the employee is a
"highly critical" one; and even this is best studied through a broader
lens. The term "highly critical," in this instance, must include lesser
ranking employees who simply have intimate knowledge of the
trade secret technology at issue. This is relevant because, unlike
trade secrets that involve business models, the purpose of hiring
away an employee essentially is to "steal" the particular technology,
rather than to gain an employee's general business skills. The
139. See supra Part III.B.1.
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umbrella of inevitable disclosure application in cases directly
involving specific Internet technology is therefore much broader
than in those cases involving general business strategies. It is up to
the courts to determine which factual scenario is at issue before
deciding whether application of the doctrine is warranted.
2. Set Maximum Limits on the Duration of Injunctions and
Limit Their Geographical Scope
Once inevitable disclosure has been deemed to apply to a
particular case, a court must decide the particulars of an injunction
prohibiting the employee from accepting employment with his new
organization. The second step in this Note's proposed process is the
institution of a series of concrete limits on the duration and scope
of injunctions in inevitable disclosure cases involving the Internet.
In typical inevitable disclosure cases, injunctions usually last for as
long as a court deems reasonably necessary to prevent one side
from continuing to gain a commercial advantage over the other,
or until the information ceases to be useful as a "trade secret." 140
If the trade secret is one concerning Internet business models and
strategies, this approach seems workable, as the industry is not
markedly different from others in terms of the prolonged utility
of such strategies. In terms of pure technologically driven trade
secrets, however, such secrets almost always have a very short
useful life, as new technologies come and go with great regularity.
Applying a harsh restriction on an employee's job prospects in these
cases must be tethered to a lower standard, as the need to protect
Internet trade secrets for an extended period of time is not as great
as it is in other contexts. Thus setting maximum limits on the
duration of injunctions will serve a two fold purpose: (1) It will keep
judges aware of the industry's ephemeral nature and help to
prevent injunctions from extending beyond the life of the trade
secret, a mistake that would be exacerbated in the Internet field
given the "accelerated time" nature of the industry; and (2) It will
provide greater motivation to Internet companies seeking to protect
valuable technological information to take the steps necessary to
140. In other words, it ceases to be a "secret" and is in the public domain. See supra Part
I.B.3.
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prevent unnecessary disclosure of such information,14' knowing that
an employee who did not sign a non-compete agreement can be
enjoined from working for a competitor only for a brief period of
time. 1
42
In terms of the geographical scope of the injunction, a familiar
problem resurfaces: how to translate inevitable disclosure concepts
into the excessively broad context of the Internet.'43 In many
injunctions involving trade secrets, courts limit their scope to a
reasonable area; thus, a court may enjoin an employee who leaves
company A with trade secret information from working for any
company within a hundred-mile radius of company A. Such a
scenario is troublesome in the Internet field, where anything online
is available to all, and theoretically has a worldwide geographical
scope. Here, again, courts must undertake a more thorough analy-
sis to determine the exact breadth of the organization's market
power. When deciding how far the injunction's grasp should extend,
a court should consider factors such as the number and origin of
website customers, the customer base of the company (in cases
where the organization started in a non-Internet context and
then developed a Web site), and the nationwide and worldwide
recognition of the company.
3. Compensate the Employee
The third and final step in this Note's proposed analysis is as
radical as it is simple. If an injunction is granted in an inevitable
disclosure case involving the absence of a non-compete agreement,
courts should require the former employer trying to protect its
trade secrets to compensate the departing employee who has been
prevented from accepting similar work with a competitor. As
previously discussed, enforcement of the inevitable disclosure doc-
trine in the absence of a non-compete agreement creates, in essence,
a judicially mandated term in the original employment contract,
and thus runs contrary to the fundamental principles of contract
law of bargained-for consideration. If the need to protect a trade
141. For example, by requiring the employee to sign a non-compete agreement upon
joining the company.
142. A reasonable duration may be somewhere in the range of three to four months.
143. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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secret is so great that a court must use the inevitable disclosure
doctrine as the basis for an injunction, it seems entirely equitable
that an employee with knowledge of the trade secret be com-
pensated by an amount equivalent to the "value" of a non-compete
clause in the original employment agreement. 114 In other words, the
court would give the employee a monetary award equal to whatever
additional compensation he would have received had he entered
into a non-compete agreement originally. This would strike a
reasonable balance between the strong employer interest in
protecting the trade secret and the equally strong employee interest
in preserving his right to earn a living.
Though it seems almost paradoxical that the "winner" of a
lawsuit should be required to pay the "loser" monetary damages,
such a result is by no means unprecedented, nor impossible to
implement." Courts could arrive at an adequate amount by
surveying employers and employees in the Internet field to
ascertain how much a non-compete agreement is valued, by looking
at similar employment contracts that differ only by the fact that one
144. In a 2000 article Jonathan Harris argues a similar remedy for courts applying the
inevitable disclosure doctrine generally (not just in Internet-related cases). He contends that
"a court should require that an injunction, like a restrictive covenant, be supported by
additional consideration," but believes that this consideration must be in the form of
"compensation above the amount the former employee received as compensation under his
or her previous contract," seeming to suggest that employees should be compensated
throughout the length of the injunction as if they were still receiving their salaries from their
former employer. See Jonathan 0. Harris, Note, The Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure: A
Proposal to Balance Employer and Employee Interests, 78 WASH. U. L. Q. 325, 343-44 (2000).
This Note contends that this remedy goes too far in attempting to balance employer and
employee interests, as it essentially allows the employee monetary gain by doing nothing.
By only compensating the employee by the value of the non-compete clause, a more equitable
solution is effected. Not only is the employee given additional monetary consideration for a
non-compete agreement, but, given the abundance of jobs in the Internet field, there is a
greater likelihood that he would be able to fird alternate employment in a different capacity
during the term of the injunction. Even if he cannot, however, this remedy still seems more
equitable than the remedy Harris proposed.
145. See, e.g., Emery Indus. v. Cottier, No. C-1-78-474, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15953, at
*22 (S.D. Ohio Aug. .18,1978) (enjoining departing employee from working in the ozone field
and requiring the former employer to pay the employee "as consideration for the
noncompetition and as a condition for the continuance of the injunction"); Spur Indus. v. Del
E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972) (establishing the concept ofa "compensated
injunction" by issuing permanent injunction against defendant in a nuisance suit and
requiring him to shut down operations, but ordering the plaintiff to "indemnify [defendant]
for a reasonable amount of the cost of moving or shutting down").
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has a non-compete clause, or by simply basing their calculation on
the amorphous concept of how much compensation it deems the
employee will lose (or has already lost) by not being able to search
freely for employment. The key point to take away from such a
measure is that it best supports the underlying theme of "balance"
that permeates all inevitable disclosure cases whose facts are based
on missing non-compete agreements, particularly in the Internet
field.
CONCLUSION
The inevitable disclosure doctrine can at once appear reason-
able and equitable, convoluted and unjust. Ranging in application
nationwide, the doctrine-on its face-unduly restricts the in-
alienable right of a person to pursue his own labor, and does so with
a weak and ill-supported justification. Despite its seemingly harsh
consequences, however, the doctrine does have a place in American
jurisprudence, particularly in the sphere of the Internet industry.
By limiting application to narrow, fact-specific scenarios, and by
setting specific remedial guidelines that allow balancing of the
inequities that the doctrine creates (such as compensated, short-
lived injunctions), this Note suggests that the inevitable disclosure
doctrine can be a feasible solution to the problems that trade secret
law was created to solve. As such, it should not be discarded.
Joseph F. Phillips
